Profil du Pays: Malaisie
Pour devenir une société plus pluraliste, la Malaisie doit d'abord s'attaquer à la question de la citoyenneté inclusive pour chacun.
Malaysia is multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-religious country in which difference and diversity have been constant national rallying points and sources of tension. The terms “race” and “ethnicity” tend to be used interchangeably in Malaysia, with more reference to culture and lineage than colour. The terms are also multi-layered. Phenotypical traits are differentiable between the Malays and Indigenous peoples, Chinese, Indians and various minority groups, while the language and culture of these groups are also distinctly preserved. These classifications were inherited from colonial rule, or, as in the specific case of the Bumiputera, they are part of a post-independence political formulation. With a view to the overlapping and artificial nature of racial, ethnic and subethnic categories, it is sufficient and practical to adopt a hybrid concept of “ethno-racial” groups to demarcate Malaysia’s most salient diversity.
At present, the majority ethno-racial Bumiputera category accounts for 70 percent of Malaysia’s citizens, of which 56 percent are Malays residing predominantly on Peninsular Malaysia, while 14 percent are Indigenous peoples, who are mainly located in Sabah and Sarawak, and the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia. Among the other categories, Chinese (23 percent) and Indians (7 percent) maintain a sizable presence, with the remaining 1 percent consisting of a diverse “Others” category. Three quarters of Malaysia’s total population lives in urban areas and cities, which are also more heterogeneous.
Malaysia emerged out of circumstances that have shaped its mode of pluralism and its dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Central to the negotiations leading to Malaya’s independence on August 31st, 1957, was the “racial bargain” by elites chiefly representing the Malays, Chinese and Indians. This bargain provided citizenship for residents and guarantees of equality and prohibition of discrimination—alongside special socio–economic provisions for Malays and “legitimate interests” of other communities in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. Malaysia was established on September 16th, 1963, with the merger of Malaya (subsequently, Peninsular or West Malaysia, terms that are used interchangeably in this report) with Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia) to form a new and broader federation. Concomitantly, the category of Article 153 beneficiaries was extended to the “natives of Sabah and Sarawak,” who, together with Malays, constitute the Bumiputera category. Four-fifths of Malaysia’s population reside in the 11 states of Peninsular Malaysia, with the balance in East Malaysia.
The Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), which sealed the country’s foundation, also stipulated various state rights and autonomy for Sabah and Sarawak on matters such as employment, religion and language. Constitutional amendments in December 2021 restored the status of Sabah and Sarawak as constituents of the federation of Malaysia, alongside Peninsular Malaysia. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether this act will remedy the erosion of trust in a perceived Peninsula-dominated polity. The lagging economic development of East Malaysia and federal government encroachment, real or perceived, continuously militate against closer regional integration.
Malaysia’s tapestry of multiple religions includes 63.5 percent identifying as Muslim, 18.7 percent as Buddhist, 9.1 percent as Christian and 6.1 percent Hindu. The Constitution recognizes Islam as “the religion of the federation” while establishing Malaysia as a secular state. The Sultans (the nine royal families in nine Peninsula states) are designated as the heads of Islam in their respective states, and the national kingship (occupied by one of the Sultans on a five-year rotation) serves in this capacity for the states without a ruling monarch and in the federal territories. Most matters related to Muslim practice fall under state-level jurisdiction. The Constitution safeguards religious freedom with certain limits (mainly applying to Muslims), and Syariah (Sharia) courts preside principally over family matters. State and federal governments maintain a religious bureaucracy with substantial scope and powers. The impact of religion on pluralism in Malaysia merits its incorporation as a diversity type in this evaluation.
The interlacing of ethno-racial and religious differences enriches diversity, but it can also amplify tension. The May 13th, 1969, outbreak of ethno-racial violence exposed deep socio–political fractures, and the tragedy constituted a turning point for the State to address Malay concerns. Subsequently, Malay political primacy was consolidated, the ruling ethno-racial coalition was expanded and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was promulgated in 1971. The NEP was a comprehensive program of economic growth, employment generation and poverty reduction, but most pivotally, it expanded and intensified pro-Bumiputera affirmative action to promote the group’s upward mobility, urbanization and representation in higher socio–economic echelons. The core of the NEP’s programs remains embedded, and its legacy is far-reaching and complicated. Yet, it is fair to say that its policies have contributed to integration and pluralism through fostering equitable representation and intergroup interaction, while also perpetuating tensions arising from unequal socio–economic opportunities for Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras. Malaysia is a complex society in which integration and polarization co-exist.
The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion—primarily exclusion—of particular groups warrant the specification of “vulnerable communities” as a diversity type. Their marginalization derives from the absence of citizenship, residency documentation and/or from socio–economic vulnerabilities. “Stateless persons” in Malaysia include Indigenous groups, especially in Sabah and Sarawak, and Indians of marginalized plantation communities. Both are deprived of official citizenship due to a lack of documentation and failure to secure registration immediately after birth. Other communities vulnerable to being stateless include the children of Malaysian women with foreign spouses who were born outside Malaysia, children of undocumented foreigners and children of foreign women who are not legally married to Malaysian citizens. These groups are denied basic opportunities, such as schooling and employment. Refugees, who are not officially recognized as such by Malaysia, face similar deprivations. Migrant workers who are undocumented, especially those in circumstances not of their own volition (for example, migrants recruited for work through false documentation), face various hardships, and even documented workers do not enjoy equal rights as citizens. Data on vulnerable communities are rather scarce, which poses challenges for evaluating the pluralism indicators for this diversity type. The relative brevity of discussion is not commensurate with the significance of vulnerable community issues with regard to pluralism.
Malaysia sustains social cohesion in a status aptly characterized as “stable tension.” The 2008 and 2013 general elections saw the end of a two-thirds parliamentary majority long held by the ethno-racial–based Barisan Nasional. This opened more space for the articulation of concerns related to justice, fairness, public accountability and democratic reform, including compliance with international human rights standards. The 2018 general election saw a major shift in Malaysia’s political landscape; ethnic- and religious-based politicians lost to a coalition mainly comprised of multi-ethnic parties. Constitutional provisions and historical precedence lay substantial foundations for multicultural and plural society, but political agendas and unchecked intolerance perpetuate polarization and can inflame ethnic and religious sentiments in public life. Citizens generally have a positive view of inter-ethnic relations and comfortably claim a national identity—as Malaysian—alongside ethno-racial and religious identities. Ethno-racial, religious and regional cleavages remain and will need to be continually, tactfully and effectively managed.